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INTRODUCTION

At the time it was decided, the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Boumediene

v.

Bush was considered an instant classic. At

long last, the Court's repeated engagement with Guantanamo could end.
This sense of relief was reinforced by the election of Barack Obama to
the presidency in November 2008. The promise of that moment appears
to have been lost. Boumediene has yet to fulfill the expansive confines
staked out by its holding and instead has been held hostage by its
ambiguities and the reluctance of elected officials to resolve the still
simmering debate over detention policy. This symposium piece provides
a brief statement asserting that the core holdings of Boumediene should
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be viewed through the lens of the robust judicial power that animated its
outcome.
II.

THE LONG WIND-UP TO BOUMEDIENE
By now, the chronology is well known.

Following the terrorist

attacks of Septe mber 11, 2001, the United States initiated a military
campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Anticipating
that scores of high-level Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives would be
captured, the United States elected to create a detention center at the U.S.
Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where such individuals could be
interrogated beyond prying eyes (and the reach of U.S. courts). T he f irst
detainees were brought to Guantanamo in January 2002.' They were not
charged with crimes.

Rather,

they were to be held indefinitely and

without any process as "enemy combatants."2
In February 2002, the first habeas corpus petition on behalf of
Guantanamo detainees was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia. The p etitioners challenged the legality of their detention,'
in the process raising fundamental constitutional and statutory questions
regarding the availability of the writ itself, and implicating important
issues of executive power and national security. The government moved
to dismiss this petition and another filed shortly thereafter, arguing that
U .S. courts had no jurisdiction over claims brought by enemy aliens held
outside the United States.4
Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled on these issues in

Bush,

Rasul

v.

holding that U.S. district courts had jurisdiction to hear the

detainees' habeas cases under the federal habeas corpus statute, 28
U.S.C. § 2241.5 In a companion case, Hamm v. Rumsfeld, the Court
ruled that a U.S. citizen could be detained as an enemy combatant

Guantanamo Bay Timeline, WASH. POST, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/
I.
guantanamo/timeline/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2010) (outlining major events related to the decision to
hold prisoners at the military base, including the arrival of the first 20 detainees).

2.
See Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep't of Def., for
the Membe� ofthe Am. Soc 'y oflnt'l Law-Council on Foreign Relations Roundtable (Dec. 12,
2002), available at http://www. cfr.�r publication/ 5312/enemy_combatants.html (laying out the
legal and factual framework estabhshmg the government designation of "enemy combatant" to
detainees).
G111JIJtanamo Bay Timeline, supra note 1. In truth, the detainees in whose names the
3.
petition was brought were being held incommunicado at Guantanamo and
did not even know that
this petition, authorized by �eir family members, had been made. See Jerry
Seper, High Court
,
Hear Guantan
�o Det:unees case, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2003, at A2. (noting that detainees
.
had not been permitted to talk with
counsel and were unaware of the lawsuits").
Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 61 (D.D.C. 2002).
4.
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481 (2004).
5.

8'.'

.:a
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pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)6 that
Congress had passed shortly

after September

11, 2001 and which

authorized the President to use all "necessary and appropriate force" to
prevent those who planned or aided the attacks of September

11 from

attacking the United States again. 1 However, the Court made clear that a

U.S. citizen in such circumstances was entitled to due process and
described, in general terms, the required elements of that process.8
These decisions marked the opening volley of a battle between the
Supreme Court and Congress over executive detention authority.
response to

(DTA).

9

In

Rasul, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005

The DTA stripped federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas

petitions filed by Guantanamo detainees, while simultaneously creating a
highly circwnscribed procedure by which detainees could seek review of
their detention in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.10 Thereafter, the government argued that the DTA was
of retroactive effect-even though the statute 's plain terms suggested
otherwise-and that all pending Guantanamo habeas cases should be
dismissed.11

In Hamdan

v.

Rumsfeld, a case largely concerned with

military trials at Guantanamo, the Supreme Court held that the DTA did
not apply

retroactively.12

Commissions Act

Congress, in turn, passed

the Military

of2006 (MCA), which again stripped federal courts of

habeas jurisdiction, but this time in explicitly retroactive terms.11
THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN BOUMEDIENE

III.

The MCA set the stage for the Court's decision in Boumedlene

v.

Bush, which required it to decide whether Guantanamo detainees had a
"constitutional privilege of habeas corpus" such that the MCA's habeas
strip was unconstitutional pursuant to the Suspension Clause.14

To

answer that question, the Court embarked on a thorough analysis of both
the history of the writ itself, including English common law, and its own
precedent concerning the extraterritorial application of the Constitution.
6.
7.
8.
9.
JO.

Authorization

for Use ofMilitary Force, Pub. L. No. 107 -40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).

542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).

Id at 533-35.
Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739 (2005).
Id § 1005(e).

13.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 , 57 4-75 (2006).
Id at 583-84.
Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(eXl)

(2006)).
14.

553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008); U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 2 ('The Privilege of the Writ of

11.

12 .

Habeas Corpus shall not b e suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public
Safety may require it.").

[Vol. 19
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The Court found that "a common thread" holding together its prec edent
was "the idea that questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors

�,

and practical concerns, not formalism."15 According to the Co

such

factors included: "( 1) the citizenship and the status of the detainee and
the adequacy of the process through which that status determination � as
made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention
took place; and

(3) the

practical obstacles inherent in resol ving the

prisoner's entitlement to the writ."16
A fter examining these factors in the context of Guantanamo, the
Court concluded that the detainees were entitled to seek the writ and to
invoke the protections of the Suspension Clause despite their status as
enemy combatants and their location.11
suspend habeas,

it

would have to

As such, if Congress were to
in accordance

"act

with

the

requirements of the Suspension Clause,"18 meaning that an adequate and
effective substitute for habeas review would have to be provided.19 After
analyzing the Court of Appeals' review process provided for in the
DTA ,20 the Court found it not to pass constitutional muster.21 As such, the
Court

held

that

the

provisions

habeas-stripping

MCA's

were

unconstitutional and ineffective.

IV. LIFE AFTER BOUMEDIENE
A.

Guantanamo Litigation
Because Boumediene was decided on narrow procedural grounds,

lower courts have been tasked with defining the contours of the merits
hearings on th� Guantanamo detainees' habeas petitions, including the

standard by which the legality of detentions is to be assessed, burdens of
The conclusions reached by

proof, and remedies if the writ is issued.

?istrict. court judges on these issues have diverged at times although there
ts relative agreement on a number of broad themes.

15. 553 U.S. at 764.
16. Id at 766.
17. Id at 771.
18. Id (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 564 (2 004) (Sc
aJi a, J., ct·1ssentmg
. )) .
19. See id
20. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 Pub. L No 109-1
48 § 1005(e)(2)(A) , 119 Stat
2680, 2742 (2005).
21. See Boumediene.' 553 U S at 774 79 , 786 92
·
( contrastmg
procedures in sectJ.on
.
· .
1005(e) of the OTA with procedures· provid
ed for in the c
1ederaI h abeas corpus statute and ·m
· swarn
·
m
statutes at issue
· v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977) and
Uni'ted States v. H ayman, 342 us
. .
205 (1952)).
•

'

·

·

·

•

·

•
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For example, courts have not always agreed on the scope of the
detention standard to be applied in individual cases,22 but they have
reached a general consensus that the Executive has the authority to detain
any individuals who were proven to be "part of" the Taliban or al-Qaeda.
One oft-quoted test for determining whether a detainee was "part of" one
of these organizations is whether "the individual functions or participates
within or under the command structure of the organization-i.e., whether
he receives and executes orders or directions."23

Regardless of the

standard employed by the lower courts, there is agreement that the
government has to make the requisite showing by a preponderance of the
evidence.24
T he issue of remedy has arisen with some frequency given that, as
of October 20 I 0, courts had issued the writ to thirty-eight of fifty-seven
detainees whose cases had been heard (a percentage that lends credibility
to those who have argued that Guantanamo contains many people who
had no business being detained). 25

In Boumediene, the Court stated that

"the habeas court must have the power to order the conditional release of
an

individual unlawfully detained-though release need not be the

exclusive remedy and is not the appropriate one in every case in which
the writ is granted."26

Nonetheless, the question has arisen whether

courts have the power to order r elease upon granting a writ, given that
U.S. cour ts cannot order a foreign country to open its doors to a
vindicated petitioner. For that reason, many of the courts granting habeas
petitions have not ordered release outright, but rather have directed the
government to "take all necessary and appropriate diplomatic steps to
facilitate ... release ."21
The D. C. Circuit waded into these issues, which implicate thorny
questions regarding separation of powers, and the proper roles of the
Executive and the judiciary in national security matters.

In Kiyemba v.
Obama ( Kiyemba I), seventeen Chinese citizens, whom the government

had already determined were not enemy combatants, moved for an order
that would compel their release into the United States, given that they
22.

Com pare cases favoring "substantially support" and those that did not adopt that

standard. Compare Hamlily

v.

Obama, 616

F.

Supp. 2d 63, 75-77 (D.D.C. 2009),

with Gherebi v.

Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 71 (D.D.C. 2009).
23.
24.

See, e.g., Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2 d at 75; Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 71.
See, e.g., El Gharani v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 144, 146 (D.D.C. 2009);

Al Ginco

v.

Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 126 (D.D.C. 2009).
25.

ANDY

Court Orders Rethink on Tortured Guantanamo Pn'soner:S Successfi.Jl Habeas Petition,

WORTHINGTON, Sept. 11, 2010,

http://www.andyworthington.eo.uk/2010/11/09/court

orders-rethink-on-torutred-guantanamo-prisoners-succ essful-habeas-petition/.
26.
27.

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779.
See, e.g., El Gharani, 593 F. Supp.

2d at 149; Al Ginco, 626

F.

Supp. 2d at 130.
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to China."x At the
feared torture or execution if they were returned
reversed a istrict
fer vent urging of the Government, the D.C. Circuit
court. - ' The
court order directing that the petition ers be brought to the
would
D.C. Circuit held that there was no authorization in any law that
Branch
allow the "district court to set aside the decisio n of the Executive
in
and to order the[] aliens brought to the United States and released
,,10
i hin gton, D. C .
u.
vvas
.
The court gave a brief history of the e xclusive right of the Executive

?

to make determinations on whom to admit and not admit within its
borders. It looked to precedent for its analytical framework that no court
can "review the determination of the political branch of the Government
to exclude a given alien" without express authorization by law.11 Turning
to possible avenues of such express authorization-including due
process, the maxim

ubijus, ibi remeduium (where there is a right there is

a remedy), the fact that the district court had jurisdiction over the habeas
petition, and a basic fairness argument-the court ultimately determined
that none of these bases was sufficient to allow the district court to
override the political branch's determination regarding these aliens.12
Similar issues were raised in Kiyemba

v.

Obama (Kiyem ba II).

There, the issue was whether district courts were empowered to require
the government to provide thirty day s' notice to both the court and

counsel before transferring detainees from Guantanamo Bay. 33 After first
holding that the district court did, in fact, have jurisdiction over the
petitioners' claim s even though those claims related

to

what the

government called "ancillary" habeas corpus rights, the court found that
habeas corpus was not available to bar the transfer of the detainees based
upon a likelihood that the detainees may be tortured in the recipient

country.14 Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Munaf v. Geren,35 the
the
not
is
Government's determination that a potential recipient country
D.C.

Circuit held

that the "district

court may

not

question

likely to torture a detainee."36
555 F.3d 1022, 1023 24 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010), modified
28.
�
on reh 'g, 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 20 I 0) (noting that five of the petitioners had rejected offers of
rese�lement and were still being held at Guantanamo Bay, the court granted the government's
.
.
the Judgment and reinstated their original opinion).
mot10n to remstate
29.

Id at 1032 .

30.

Id at 1026-29.

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id at I 025-26 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id at 1026-29.
561F.3d 509, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 1880 (2010).
Id at 512-14.

35.
36.

553 U.S. 674, 702 (2008).
Ki yemba fl, 561 F.3d at 514.
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Given these decisions, the most critical issues with respect to the
Guantanamo

litigation remain

open even

after

Bownediene.

In

particular, can a court order the release of an individual it has found, in
essence, to be innocent or can it do no more than issue

an

advisory

opinion that grants the writ and pleads with the government to effect a
release? Further, when there is credible evidence that an individual could
be subjected to torture or worse in a country to which the United States
plans to send the individual, does a habeas court properly seized with
jurisdiction have any means to prevent the transfer?
B

Extra-Guantanamo Litigation
It remains to be seen whether

applied

to

U.S.

detention

centers

Boumediene ultimately will be
outside

of Guantanamo

Bay.

Boumediene, of course, was somewhat fact specific and relied in part on
the unusual de facto sovereignty exercised by the U.S. in Guantanamo.
Indeed, the Court cited this reality

as

one reason why the Guantanamo

detainees were differently situated from those in

Johnson

v.

Eisentrager,

in which the Court had held that habeas jurisdiction did not extend to
nonresident enemy aliens detained in a German prison operated by the
Allied Powers after World War II.37
Nonetheless,

one judge

in

the

D.C.

District

Court

found

Boumediene to be controlling in the affirmative as to the question of
whether certain individuals detained at the Bagram Air Force Base
(operated by the United States in Afghanistan) were entitled to bring
habeas petitions.38 Not surprisingly perhaps given its serial hostility to
the claims of detainees, the D.C. Circuit reversed in Al Maqaleh

v. Gates
(Al Maqaleh II)
There the court purported to examine the factors
outlined in Boumediene for determining the reach of the Suspension
.39

Clause, and concluded that the "practical obstacles inherent in resolving
the prisoner's entitlement to the writ" were decidedly in favor of the
United States' position that the Suspension Clause should not be
available in Bagram.40 In particular, the court noted the fact that the war
was still ongoing in Afghanistan, and that the United States does not
exercise the same type of sovereignty over Bagram Air Force Base as it
does over Guantanamo Bay.41
37.
38.

339

U.S.

763, 780-81 (1950).

Al Maqaleh v. Gates

(Al Maqaleh l),

604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 235 (D.D.C. 2009), revli,

605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
39.

Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh

40.

Id at
Id at

41.

II), 605 FJd 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

95-97 (internal quotation marks omitted).
97-98.
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Any appeal of this decision would b e heard by a Supreme Court
that includes Elena Kagan.

Justice Kagan was counsel

government in Al Maqaleh JI as Solicitor General

�

for

the

an� there�ore: would

presumably recuse herself from hearing he case now.

Cons1denng that
.
there are four justices whose votes agamst the Bagram detamees are a
certainty in all but the most metaphysical sense, there is no reason to
b elieve that Al Maqaleh II will be disturbed any time soon.

As such,

there may be little in the way of extra-Guantanamo application of

Boumediene during the foreseeable future.
V.

THE (NOT So)

NEW WORLD OF DETENTION LAW

The extensive chronology of Guantanamo detention litigation,
broken into

its

component parts,

disguises

the

significance

Boumediene relative to the Court's decisions that preceded it.

of
The

crucial distinction between Boumediene and its predecessors, at its
the legal basis of the Court's holding and an
u nmistakable subtext that the Court was no longer content with

essence, is two-fold:

resolution by the nation's political branches.
The decisions in
statutory, rather

than

Hamdan, HamdJ�
constitutional

and Rasul were premised on

inter pretation.

The

statutory

approach pitched the dispute over detention policy as a separation of
powers tension between the President and Congress.

The threshold

question in Boumediene was constitutional and not statutor y--either the
Suspension Clause could be used
detention policy or it could not.

to

challenge the government's
In contrast to a statutory holding, a

finding of constitutional infirmity renders a course of action per se
unlawful, rather than simply politically difficult. As such, decisions like

Hamdan had been characterized as "democracy-forcing" rather than
categorical judicially invoked prohibitions.43 Thus, the Supreme Court's
position as the arbiter of constitutional meaning transformed

the

fundamental separation of powers issue from one between the political
branches into one pitting the ability (and willingness) of the judiciar y to
affirmatively invalidate political branch action on grounds that the
political branches are incapable of resolving.

This movement by the

Court inexorably changed the nature of the separation of powers issues
from one between the political branches into a necessar y (if somewhat
42.

Michael Doyle, Court: Bagram Prisoners Don't Have Guantanamo Habeas Rights,
May 21, 2010, http://ww.w mcclatchydc.com/2010/05/21/94620/court-bagram
prisoners-dont-have-html.
43. Jack M. Balkin, Hamdan as a Democracy-Forcing Decision, BALKINIZ
ATION (June 29,
2006, 1 :07 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/20 06/06/hamdan-as-democracy-forcing-decision. html.
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reluctant) commentary regarding the judicial position in detenninations
potentially impacting national security.
The
frequent

Court's repeated

appointment with detention

insistence on statutory

interpretation

betrays

policy and
the tension

between a long-standing position of deference in national security
questions and an obvious discomfort with national security policies that
unmistakably rolled back protections many legal scholars considered
implicit in the rights-based revolution within constitutional doctrine over
the past several decades. The Boumediene decision attempts to bridge
this divide with ambitious action coupled with language of restraint.
Interpre ting this disconnect has, to date, largely been left to the lower
courts. That stasis will have to change.
Boumediene s Ambitiousness and Restraint

A.

Historically, the Supreme

Court has deferred to the political

branches on questions involving foreign relations generally and national
security specifically. Within this deferential posture, the positions of the
executive branch have been granted exceptional weight.
Court's deference in World War II era cases like Johnson
and Ex Parte

Qwiin45 fonned the foundation of

The Supreme
v.

Eisentrager44

the Bush Administration's

legal position as the litigation over detention began to unfold in the early
2000s.

In fact, it is ahnost impossible to imagine Guantanamo without

the broad, deferential decisions by the judiciary of that earlier era.
Conventional academic wisdom has posited that the judiciary's
deferential posture was animated by the import of such questions to the
nation's survival and the institutional advantages enjoyed by the political
branches, especially the President, in questions of foreign relations. This
exercise of judicial deference has frequently been characterized

as

a

demonstration of judicial modesty.
The normative desirability and impetus behind such deference has
been debated by academics for several yearS.46 W hatever the wisdom or
motivating animus, Boumediene represents a judicial willingness to
44.
45 .
46.

339 U.S. 763, 789-91 (1950).
See 317 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1942).
This exercise ofjudicial deference has frequently been characterized as demonstration

ofjudicial modesty. This claim has been persuasively questioned by Professor Jack Goldsmith,
who has characterized judicial decision making in foreign affairs matters as an exercise of a
"foreign relations effects test." Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Fonnalism in Umted States Foreign
Relations Law, 70 U. COL. L. REv. 1395, 1395-97 (1999). Under Goldsmith's analysis judges
defer when they view the effects on foreign relations as substantial, but eschew deference when

�

they ?e ieve such effects to be marginal. If true, such independent determinations by the judiciary
are difficult to categorize as acts ofjudicial "modesty."

Id at 1410-24.
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carve a solid foothold into questions invoking foreign affairs and t� atio� al
security. For the first time, the Supreme Court reversed presidential
.
actions that the executive branch had energetically defended as
fundamental to its prosecution of national security policy, while that

?

challenged policy remained in force. This is likely to give p a�se to t e
next administration that contemplates gross unilateral expansion of its
own power.
While the

Court's repudiation

of the

. ,
. .
Bush Admtrustrat10n s

detention policy marked a robust stake for the judiciary in national
security policy, its stated path to that outcome suggests a distinct fear of
institutional overreach in three easily discernible ways-the absence of
hallmarks, an excessive reliance on procedural over substantive law, and
the inherent tension between its rhetoric and its result

regarding

deference.
Given the practical import of its decision, the Court's opinion
provides precious little guidance for lower court implementation.

Teed

u p for consideration, but either left inexplicably vague or unexpressed
altogether, were fundamental issues running the spectrum of detention,
including the threshold question of Suspension Clause applicability and
the question of whether the judiciar y possesses the power to order a
detainee's release contrary to an executive branch demand.
On one level, a minimalist intervention in the consequentialist
oriented policy realm of national security is understandable and l audable.
Over the past few decades the Court has consistently embraced a limited
exercise of its power to nullify law in favor of a variety of interpretive
canons intended to force increased legislative clarity and in recognition
of democratic prerogatives of law.47

These judicial predispositions,

coupled with the entrenched doctrine of deferring to political branch
directives in foreign affairs and national security not only make the
Court's opinion understandable but also perhaps prudent. Unfortunately,
the fundamental rationale for such judicial
inapplicable in determining appropriate

minimalism is largely

detention law

and

lawful

detention policy.
Remand to the lower courts to enable the slow marination endemic
to the common law system is typical and appropriate when underlying
p olicy choices do not cause significant harm to the parties at interest.
The creation of a clearly lawful and fair detention policy in c ombating
47
Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Ch evron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has
.
FaJled
and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CoNN. L. REv. 779, 786 n.18 (2009) (citing
·

�I �lewellyn for the long-s �ding assertion that canons of interpretation often point in varying
d1Tect10ns, thus ofe
t n undermmmg congressional purposes).
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terrorism does not represent the type of legal exercise in which the slow
machinations of judicial experimentation are wise, however.

In these

circumstances, the Court's reticence hinders the development of, and
pragmatic reliance upon, a doctrine of how and when the lower courts
should exercise the judiciary's power in matters of foreign affairs and has,
by

all

appearances,

failed

to

enable

the

current

presidential

administration from plotting a safe policy course for future detentions.

Standards ofUncertainty

B.

As noted above, the detention policy at Guantanamo Bay has been
in effect for years and had been the subject of multiple Supreme Court
cases that have yet to provide certainty. There can be little doubt that
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Boumediene betrayed a judicial frustration
that the political branches had not incorporated the Court's decisions in

Rasul and Hamdan in a manner that steered more decisively toward
protecting individual rights. Specifically, the Court's repudiation of the
government's

argument

that

the

detentions

at

Guantanamo

were

completely ungoverned by the Constitution as a threshold matter was
manifestly doomed by the Court's dicta in Rllsul, which offered that the
breadth of the statutory right to habeas corpus at question in that case
would logically extend to the constitutional scope of the writ.48 However,
just as Boumediene represents a case made necessary by previous
decisions' limited holdings, Boumediene was bound to perpetuate
uncertainty, given the amorphous standards it created and its judicial
silence on certain points.

1.

When Does the Suspension Clause Attach?
In the

end, Bownediene answered the system's most exigent

constitutional question, but created new universes of ambiguity in two
ways.

First, it failed to provide a standard of Suspension Clause

applicability in a manner that could be readily applied to other emerging
detention regimes.

Second, it ignored the constellation of issues that

inevitably flowed from definitively granting habeas rights to detained
parties at Guantanamo.

Boumediene failed to reach either of two obvious conclusions that
would have created clear rules for future decisions-that individuals held
extraterritorially by the U.S. government possess habeas rights under the
Suspension Clause or they do not.

48.

In so doing, the Court necessarily

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 734 (2008).
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moved into the unstable realm of the "balancing test." Unfortunately, the
balancing test embraced by the Court relies upon factors that themselves
are ambiguously determined or questionable in their releva nce.

Under

Boumediene three elements are to be considered in balancing whether
the Suspension Clause is applicable:

(1) the detainee's citizenship and

status, and the appropriateness of the process by which that status
attached;

(2) the situs of capture and, subsequently, detention; and (3) the

practical considerations inherent to determining a detainee 's entitlement
to the writ.49
These

factors

are

individually

and

collectively

ambiguous.

Individually, each relies upon subjective judgments in which reasonable
minds could disagree despite being presented with identical facts. The
appropriateness of the process may invoke a sustained individualized
analysis of procedural safeguards offered, but is sharply limited by
endless variations of status determinations and their consequences.
Presumably the Suspension Clause more likely applies when the site of
capture is not a battlefield. This may be sensible if the battlefield in
question is conventional in nature, as at that point the other instruments
of law, such as the Geneva Conventions, are more likely to apply.so
However, Guantanamo gained its fame precisely because individuals at
or near areas of low-level conflict, the contemporary "battlefield," were
not granted access to legal regimes such as the Conventions.s• Moreover,
the situs of detention not only possesses substantial ambiguity, but
Under international law, national forces that

questionable relevance.

capture individuals they believe to be dangerous are required to remove
those detainees away from the zones of danger.s2 It is unclear on its face
why detention of an individual in a safe zone in Afghanistan would
militate against applying the Suspension Clause , while the detention of
the same individual at a U.S. military base in Germany, for example,
would not. Finally, the Court's reference to practical considerations tells
u s nothing as to what specific considerations are relevant, what weight to
give different such considerations, or whether any deference should be
afforded to the government's assertions as to such considerations.
In a collective sense, the Boumediene test offers no guidance as to
how the three factors should be weighed for final determination. The

Id at 766.
49.
50.
See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convent
ion III].
S 1.
See Derek Jinks & David Sloss ls the President Bo1U1d by the Geneva Conventions?,
90 CORNELLL. REV. 97, 108-20 (2004).
52.
Geneva Convention III, supmnote 50, art. 19.
,
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absence of such guidance exacerbates the uncertainty of the individual
factors by creating a macro subjective judgment that, presumably, is
enabled by micro subjective judgments. This was ably d emonstrated in

Al Maqaleh, the D.C. Circuit's decision examining whether the
Boumediene Suspension Clause standard would entitle those held at the
Bagram Air Force base in Afghanistan to habeas rights.53 In Al Maqaleh,
the Court held that the citizenship/status, situs of capture, and other
detention

factors

outlined

in

weighed

Boumediene

Suspension Clause application. 54

in favor

of

Despite this, the Court held that the

practical considerations prong of the test weighed prohibitively in favor
of precluding the application of the Suspension Clause.55 The fact that
the Court's position on this matter was not obvious on its face is
demonstrated by the fact that in the same case the U.S. District Court had
reached the opposite conclusion with apparently equal confidence.56
What Is the Judiciary's Power in Ordering Release?

2.

The protections embedded in habeas proceedings are entirely
dependent upon the judicial power to order the release of someone
unlawfully detained by the government. At the time

Boumediene

was

argued and decided, the government appeared unwilling to argue, and the
Court unlikely to decide, that a grant of habeas to detainees might not
encompass the power of the judiciary to order release. As a result, it is
ironic that a decision issued by the Supreme Court on the same day as

Boumediene has

posed the greatest obstacle to judicially ordered release

of detainees found unlawfully held. The Court in

Munaf held that a U.S.

court sitting in habeas could not prevent the transfer of t wo Americans
being held legally by the U.S. military in Iraq to Iraqi authorities.51 This
holding was interpreted by the D.C. Circuit to mean that the judiciary
was not empowered to "second-guess" government determinations of the
transfer (or release) of detainees from Guantanamo.

C.

The Future ofB oumediene
The

view

of

Bownediene majority
separation

of

Resolving Power and Deference

-

decision based its holding on a structural

powers

without

relying

determination of Suspension Clause rights.

53.
54.
55.
56.
5 7.

II, 605 F.3d 84, 93-99 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Id at 94-97.
Id at 99.
Id at 97.
Munafv. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 705 (2008).
Al Maqaleh

on

a

structural

As such, resolving the
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tension between Boumediene's deferential rhetoric and its nondefcrential
ruling is, at its core, not about allowing judicial experimentation, but
rather about more clearly defining judicial power in an area where such
power has historically been comparatively weak .

.
The overarching theme of Boumediene is not found in questions of

citizenship, status, situs, and asserted practicalities.

None o f those

factors meaningfully resulted in the Court stepping away from deference
doctrines and toward a more muscular view of judicial power in areas of
national security.

As a precedent, the crucial holding in Bomnediene

derived from the Court's w illingness to exercise judicial power to rein in
political branch national security actions as a matter of constitutional
doctrine.

While not utilizing the clear structural rules available in

interpreting the Suspension Clause, the Court embraced

a larger

structural Constitution that "ensures that, except during periods of formal
suspension, the Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the writ, to
maintain the delicate balance of governance that is itself the surest
safeguard of liberty."58

Under this reading, deference to the political

branches as to release or applicability of the writ becomes fundamentally
contrary to the responsibility held by the judicial branch as an
independent branch of government.
In order for Boumediene to take its proper place as one of the
substantial Court decisions of this era, it is necessary for judges and
policy makers to understand its fundamental holding as more than the
sum of its parts. To date, the Obama Administration has failed to heed
this lesson, scrutinizing facts rather than the larger dimensions of the
exercise of government power.
VI. CONCLUSION
In

Boumediene the Court takes a significant step away from

deferring its role in areas of national security.

T he Court left

implementation of its decision to the lower courts.

To date, policy

makers have allowed the lower courts to resolve the logistical ambiguities
in

Boumediends

murky

standards

and

silences.

Instead,

both

policymakers and lower court judges should take up the task of looking
beyond ambiguities in order to understand the decision in a manner
consistent with the decision's unmistakably forward-looking view m
order to create legal and policy certainty for the future.

58.

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

